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Introduction 
Over the course of years, many policies have been created to ease the acceptance of foreign 
workers into the Japanese labor market. However, Japan has been and still is being widely 
criticized  by domestic and international media for having a too strict immigration policy, and 
for not even having a formal policy for the acceptance of unskilled labor at all123. Nonetheless, 
the number of foreign workers who participate in the Japanese labor market has been 
increasing and is now larger than ever.    
During the economic boom years of the 1980s there was a severe labor shortage for low-paid 
unskilled work, which caused a significant influx of unskilled foreign laborers4. To control the 
number of foreign workers entering the country, the Immigration Control Act was revised in 
1990. The Japanese government made it possible for professionals and skilled laborers to 
enter Japan with more ease than before, but refused to formally admit unskilled workers. In 
addition, a penalty system against labor brokers and employers of illegal immigrants was 
established to deal with the issue of illegal foreign workers5. Controversially, the Japanese 
government started making use of various back door mechanisms through which foreigners 
were legally admitted to do unskilled work6, whilst the lack of enforcement of the newly 
introduced penalty system throughout the 1990s made it possible for illegal foreigners to 
continue working7. Subsequently, this gave rise to the kaikoku - sakoku debate about the 
                                                          
1 Yomiuri Shimbun, “Tougher Visa Rules: The Ministry of Justice Has Disclosed”, May 22, 1990. 
2 Yomiuri Shimbun, “Japan Struggles to Attract Professionals From Abroad”, November 22, 2011. 
3 Chico Harlan “Strict Immigration Rules May Threaten Japan’s Future”, The Washington Post July 28, 2010, 
accessed April 28, 2016, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/07/27/AR2010072706053.html. 
4 Betsy Brody, Opening the Door: Immigration, Ethnicity, and Globalization in Japan, (New York: Routledge, 
2002), 34. 
5 Hiromi Mori, Immigration Policy and Foreign Workers in Japan, (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1997), 99. 
6 Ibid., 96. 
7 Wayne A. Cornelius, "Japan: The Illusion of Immigration Control" in Controlling Immigration: A Global 
Perspective, ed. Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin, & James F. Hollifield (Stanford University Press, 1994), 
391-392. 
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societal implications of large-scale immigration and whether or not Japan should be open or 
closed to foreign workers' entry. 
Existing literature argues that the newly introduced back door mechanisms by the 1990 
Immigration Act were a way of the government to facilitate the persistent demand by 
capitalists for cheap foreign labor to fill the labor shortage. Others have focused on the 
deliberate lack of penalty enforcement on the side of the government which allowed illegal 
foreigners to continue working for the same purpose as mentioned above. Many also note that 
these factors, amongst others, add to the highly exploitative nature of unskilled foreign 
workers. Whilst these arguments most certainly are of importance, the present thesis argues 
that literature concerning immigration policies has focused too greatly on the reason for the 
existence of back door policies. In contrast, we also need to understand and explain why the 
Japanese government at this moment in time still does not have a formal policy for the 
admittance of unskilled foreign workers. The aim of the present thesis, therefore, is to build 
on the existing debate whilst shifting our attention more towards the side of politics and the 
government. Hence, the central question of the present thesis will be: why is it that the 
Japanese government does not accept unskilled foreign workers through a formal policy, but 
does allow the continued participation of unskilled foreign workers in the labor market 
through back door mechanisms? 
This thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter one begins with a political analysis in which we will 
discuss the role of elite conservative politicians within the government their influence in 
immigration policymaking. The next chapter provides an analysis of various back door 
mechanisms that facilitate the admittance of unskilled foreign workers, in which we will 
illustrate that their existence is for the sole purpose of supplying labor to fill the shortage in 
the workforce. In the third and last chapter, an analysis of different work-related visa 
categories will make us understand how the type of citizenship as determined by a person’s 
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visa relates to vulnerability to exploitation and human rights violations. Especially this final 
chapter aims to demonstrate just how important formalizing an immigration policy for the 
admittance of unskilled foreign workers actually. This will then bring us to our conclusion 
that the significant influence of elite conservative politicians in the government forms -up to a 
certain extent- an obstacle to formalizing an immigration policy for unskilled foreign workers. 
Moreover, facilitating the need for relatively cheap labor in sectors of acute labor shortage is a 
convenient byproduct of consequently accepting unskilled foreign workers by means of back 
door mechanisms that impose various restrictions on their workers’ rights. This, in turn, 
impacts the vulnerability to exploitation and violation of human rights of the respective 
workers.  
 
Literature Review 
Given that the number of foreign workers that are active in Japan has been growing ever since 
the revision of the 1990 Immigration Act, it is important to establish why, up until today, the 
Japanese government still does not formally admit unskilled foreign workers. Existing 
literature has suggested that to accept, or to not accept, is a question relating to a more 
longstanding debate on foreign workers: the sakoku - kaikoku debate. Notwithstanding the 
large number of foreign workers already present in the country, the sakoku side would see 
Japan keeping its doors closed to foreign workers. Here, they emphasize problems that would 
arise from the entry and work of foreigners, like labor market segmentation, clustering of 
foreigners with low-status jobs and destruction of Japan's societal relations8910. The kaikoku 
side however, recognizes that foreign workers in Japan are already large in number and that a 
                                                          
8 Kanji Nishio, "The Danger of an Open Door Policy", Japan Echo 17:1 (1990), 51-56. 
9 Kazuaki Tezuka, "The Foreign Worker Problem in Japan", Japanese Economic Studies 21 (1992), 3-28. 
10 Kazuaki Tezuka, Gaikokujin Rodosha, (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1989). 
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way needs to be found to pragmatically deal with the current difficult situation of immigrants. 
They emphasize the vulnerability of foreign workers and human rights violations that are a 
byproduct of the back door mechanisms for the admittance of foreign workers, but tend to 
focus on the adaptability of Japanese society to these problematic issues1112. As can be 
concluded from this debate, both kaikoku and sakoku opponents see large-scale immigration 
of foreign workers as a possible disruption of societal relations in Japan however, they way in 
which both sides approach the issues related to foreign workers is fundamentally different.  
Whereas the participants in the kaikoku - sakoku debate see the possible negative consequence 
to Japanese society of large-scale immigration as a reason for their strong stance on whether 
or not to admit foreign workers, other prevalent literature emphasizes the role institutions play 
in the immigration process. For one, it has been argued that Japan's immigration policy is 
underdeveloped because there exists little consensus between different segments of 
bureaucracy about the number of foreign workers that should be admitted13. Another study 
about the challenges of policymaking notes how comprehensive coordination between 
different kinds of policies is needed to make the respective policies a success14. These studies 
suggest that the key to successful immigration policies would lie at the side of the government 
and their ability to draw up a coordinated plan to pragmatically introduce a formal 
immigration policy for unskilled foreign workers.  
Consequently, a great deal of research has focused on analyzing immigration policies on their 
actual purpose, with an emphasis on the existence of the plethora of back door mechanisms. A 
study by Junya Morooka(2006) suggests that the 1990 Immigration Control Act aimed at 
                                                          
11 Hiroshi Komai, Foreign Migrants in Contemporary Japan, (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press 2001). 
12 Haruo Shimada, Japan's Guest Workers: Issues and Public Policies (University of Tokyo Press 1994).  
13 Wayne A. Cornelius, "Japan: The Illusion of Immigration Control" in Controlling Immigration: A Global 
Perspective, ed. Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin, & James F. Hollifield (Stanford University Press, 1994), 
386. 
14 Nana Oishi, "The Limits of Immigration Policies: The Challenges of Highly Skilled Migration in Japan", 
American Behavioral Scientist  56:8 (2012), 15. 
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attracting professional and highly skilled foreign workers also utilized so-called back door 
channels as a means for capitalists' need for cheap unskilled labor within the context of global 
competition15. In line with this view, Atsushi Kondo briefly mentions in his discussion paper 
that the government does not actively tackle the problem of illegal workers because they are 
satisfying the needs for labor of smaller businesses16. Secondly, Kondo notes how various 
programs are being introduced to accept workers on a temporary basis - for example trainees - 
to try and keep the inflow of labor consistent, and how nikkeijin are being used as a way of 
accepting labor without restrictions on the scope of labor activities 17. In a similar way, 
Hiromi Mori argues that the ambivalence in the government’s policy exists because certain 
industries and occupations are deliberately looking for illegal foreign workers, since even the 
cost of unskilled labor for nikkeijin – as the most preferred type of employee – has gone up18. 
These studies imply that the government not only knowingly used (illegal) foreign laborers to 
facilitate businesses' structural demand for low-paid work, but also used the back door 
mechanisms to fill the existing labor shortage.  
Other research that is connected to the need for cheap labor concerns the link between 
different types of citizenship an immigrant obtains and their respective position within society. 
One such study is by Hironori Onuki(2012), who concludes that the connection between 
immigration and the type of citizenship is the underlying context that has driven illegal 
foreigners to accept highly invisible and exploitable subject positioning19. By this, Onuki 
means that when foreign workers have the status of “temporary” or “illegal”, it only further 
intensifies their marginality, alienation and vulnerability to exploitation. According to Robert 
                                                          
15 Junya Morooka, "The Rhetoric of the Foreign Worker Problem in Contemporary Japan", (PhD diss., 
University of Pittsburgh, 2006), 44. 
16 Atsushi Kondo, “Immigration Law and Foreign Workers in Japan”, Kyushu Sangyo University Faculty of 
Economics discussion paper (2000), 2. 
17 Ibid., 2. 
18 Hiromi Mori, Immigration Policy and Foreign Workers in Japan, (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1997), 102. 
19 Hironori Onuki, "The Everyday Spaces of Global Labour Migration: Migrant Workers as Political Agents in 
Japan". (PhD diss., York University Toronto, 2012), 282. 
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Stuart Yoder(2011), foreign migrants enter a subordinate status that subsequently leads to 
deviant behavior and a higher vulnerability to discrimination as they are placed outside of 
mainstream society20. A good example of this is a case study by Nobuko Suzuki on workplace 
discrimination of foreigners in a Japanese company, who concludes that government policies 
don’t work because society is not build to be ready for the intake of large numbers of 
foreigners21. The studies in this area are a prime example of the negative consequences of 
taking in unskilled foreign workers on the basis of informal back door mechanisms as 
opposed to a formal policy. Given that vulnerability to exploitation and human rights 
violations is so much higher because the respective workers are admitted on the basis of a 
back door mechanism, it will show just how important it is to introduce formal policies for 
immigration of unskilled workers. 
Above research certainly provides valuable insight into the issues revolving the back door 
mechanisms, however, it does not provide a clear answer to the question why a formal 
immigration policy for unskilled foreign workers is still lacking. Hence, we must shift our 
attention to another area which affects immigration policymaking: politics. Indeed, Michael 
Strausz(2010) suggests that Japanese conservatives in general, and LDP politicians in 
particular, are in major disagreement about the role of foreign residents in Japanese society22. 
Though not explicitly mentioned, Strausz' research concerns the kaikoku - sakoku debate. He 
makes clear distinction between what he calls "conservative optimists" and "conservative 
pessimists" and their respective stance on whether or not Japan is able to withstand any social 
or political change as a result of large-scale immigration or not23. Naturally, this influences 
                                                          
20 Robert Stuart Yoder, Deviance and Inequality in Japan: Japanese Youth and Foreign Migrants, (Bristol: 
Policy Press, 2011), 65. 
21 Nobuko Suzuki, Nihon ni  Okeru Koyō Seisaku Oyobi Rōdō Ichiba: Asia Jinzai Shikin Kōsō (March, 2012), 
38. 
22 Michael Strausz, "Japanese Conservatism and the Integration of Foreign Residents", Japanese Journal of 
Political Science 11:2 (2010), 245. 
23 Ibid., 246.  
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the process of immigration policymaking, and, subsequently, influence the approach to 
admittance of unskilled foreign workers. 
The current thesis therefore, examines the influence of elite conservative politicians in the 
process of immigration policymaking. Surprisingly, this area has been neglected, as the 
majority of the literature has focused on the purpose for the existence of the growing number 
of back door mechanisms. Still, as mentioned in the literature above, the vulnerability to 
exploitation that is a consequence of admitting unskilled foreign workers on the basis of back 
door mechanisms is an important part in this thesis' research, as it shows just how important it 
is formalize a policy as such.  
While above studies provide us with a great deal of relevant issues and theories in the 
respective areas related to Japanese immigration policies, they do not come without their 
limitations. As shown above, a large part of the research concerning the workings of Japanese 
immigration policies for unskilled workers focuses on societal implications of large-scale 
migration or on the meaning of the existence of back door mechanisms. This thesis however, 
would argue that insufficient attention has been paid to the question why an actual formal 
policy for the admittance of unskilled foreign workers is absent. In seeking the answer to the 
question why at this moment unskilled foreign workers are still being admitted on the basis of 
back door mechanisms, as opposed to of formal policies,  we will turn to the side of politics in 
order to make our reader understand that the influence of elite conservative politicians plays a 
significant role in forming the immigration policies in Japan and therefore forms an obstacle 
to formalizing any kind of policy to admit unskilled foreign workers. 
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Theory and Methods 
Our central question and abovementioned issues will be examined within the framework of 
the Principal-Agent Theory (PAT), a heuristic tool employed for multiple disciplines, with an 
inherent moral hazard model and applicable to political science. According to Lapuente 
(2011) the core principle behind the Principal-Agent Theory concerns an asymmetric 
relationship between two parties in terms of both interests and information, and, in some cases, 
also a power asymmetry24. This highlights another aspect of the Principal-Agent Theory: the 
presence of a "moral hazard"25, for which Hart and Holmström (1987) employ a dichotomous 
typology. This entails the so-called hidden action model in which Agents take unobservable 
actions, and the hidden information model in which the Agents opt for observable actions26. 
The hidden action model is of particular importance to us since it acknowledges the 
dominance of the Principal over the Agent, who, as a consequence, is able to make a "take-it-
or-leave-it"27 offer to the Agent. This framework therefore, allows us to narrowly define the 
nature of the relationship between the two respective parties: the government and more 
specifically, elite conservative politicians; and unskilled foreign workers.  
In a broader sense, how decisions concerning immigration policymaking made by politicians 
at the top level affect those concerned, and the consequences thereof, reflect the type of 
macro-micro analysis that is often employed within the framework of PAT28. The strength of 
examining the influence of elite conservative politicians upon immigration policymaking 
through such a framework lies in its explanatory power of the symbiotic relationship between 
                                                          
24 Victor Lapuente, "Principal-Agent Theory" in 21st Century Political Science : A Reference Handbook, ed.  
John T. Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning, (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications 2010), 43. 
25 John James Quinn, "Principal-Agent Theory" in International Encyclopedia of Political Science, ed. Dirk 
Berg-Schlosser and Bertrand Badie, (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications 2011), 2127.  
26 Oliver D. Hart and Bengt Holmström, "The Theory of Contracts", (paper presented at the World Congress of 
the Econometric Society, Cambridge, Massachussets 1985), 9. 
https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/64265/theoryofcontract00hart.pdf?sequence=1 
27 Victor Lapuente, 2127.  
28 James S. Coleman, "Social Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action", American Journal of Sociology 
91:6 (1986), 1323-1324.  
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politics and law of immigration policy. As such, when drawing a parallel to employ this 
framework to this thesis' research, the elite politicians will be viewed as dominant Principal, 
unskilled foreign workers as subordinate Agent, and vulnerable employment as moral hazard 
according to the hidden action model. 
That having said, I do not mean to contend that elite politicians are entirely free to act based 
on their own ideas and implement immigration policies accordingly. Needless to say, 
politicians in a democracy are bound by their constituents as they also care about being re-
elected. Hence, we would argue that there is a correlation - thought not a direct relation - 
between conservative streams of political thought and how this translates into actual 
policymaking. The current thesis therefore, will merely try to generate an understanding of 
how conservative politicians are able to influence the political discourse on immigration 
policymaking and what this subsequently means for the admittance of unskilled foreign 
workers. 
Within the broader framework of PAT, Strausz' arguments on the presence of "conservative 
optimists" and "conservative pessimists"29 will be a broad starting point to define different 
conservative streams of thought within Japanese politics. Other data consisting of primary 
sources like government  statistics and written reports by the Immigration Bureau of Japan 
and the Japanese Ministry of Justice present us the specific interests and preferences of the 
respective politicians as being the 'Principal'. While emphasizing this, newspaper articles 
containing interviews with elite politicians will explicitly highlight the trend of thoughts on 
the debate whether or not to admit foreign workers on a formal basis.  
An analysis on the function of current informal mechanisms to admit unskilled foreign 
workers will implicitly deal with the conflict of interests between the 'Principal' and the 
                                                          
29 Michael Strausz, "Japanese Conservatism and the Integration of Foreign Residents", Japanese Journal of 
Political Science 11:2 (2010), 246.  
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'Agent' as formulated in the PAT. In doing so, we will build on the existing literature on how 
these mechanisms are being used as back door channels to supply cheap labor to the 
respective sectors in need competition3031. The primary data presented will consist of several 
articles from the 1990 revised Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act and a 
variety of programs and mechanisms that currently allow for the entry of foreign workers to 
perform unskilled work.  
As Onuki and Yoder have argued, there is a connection between immigration and citizenship 
types and subsequent vulnerability to exploitation and violation of human rights3233. These 
studies will provide a basis to examine the interplay between different citizenship types as 
determined by visa categories, marginalization in society and the issues of worker exploitation 
and violation of human rights. Other data will consist of primary sources such as the articles 
of the 1990 Immigration Act and the currently existing visa types.  
In applying these analyses to our research question within the framework of the Principal-
Agent Theory, the current thesis will provide insight into how elite conservative politicians 
play a significant role in forming Japanese immigration policies. Subsequently, it allows to 
generate understanding of why it is so important to introduce a formal policy for the 
admittance of unskilled foreign workers given the highly vulnerable nature of their 
employment. 
                                                          
30 Junya Morooka, "The Rhetoric of the Foreign Worker Problem in Contemporary Japan", (PhD diss., 
University of Pittsburgh, 2006), 44. 
31 Atsushi Kondo, “Immigration Law and Foreign Workers in Japan”, Kyushu Sangyo University Faculty of 
Economics discussion paper (2000), 2. 
32 Hironori Onuki, "The Everyday Spaces of Global Labour Migration: Migrant Workers as Political Agents in 
Japan". (PhD diss., York University Toronto, 2012), 282. 
33 Robert Stuart Yoder, Deviance and Inequality in Japan: Japanese Youth and Foreign Migrants, (Bristol: 
Policy Press, 2011), 65. 
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 Politics and Immigration Policymaking in Japan: the Role of Elite 
Conservative Politicians 
Since the start of the Heisei period in 1989, there have been 16 different Prime Ministers who 
have taken office. Although they came from different political parties, throughout the years 
the most dominant was - and still is- the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). One 
can imagine that this means that the LDP has shaped much of Japanese immigration policy. 
This chapter will take a closer look at rhetoric and policies under the tenure of several Prime 
Ministers that served the LDP, with a focus on Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe, as being 
two prominent figures throughout recent history. In adopting the Principal-Agent Theory, we 
will view these elite conservative politicians as the 'Principal' and hence, explore what their 
preferences and interests are as opposed to those of the 'Agent', being the unskilled foreign 
workers.    
Shinzo Abe is the current Prime Minister of Japan, making this his second tenure after having 
held office once before in 2006. As leader of the LDP he has become known for his 
‘Abenomics’ grand strategy for economic revitalization that is so frequently reported about in 
the newspapers34. His strong opinion about foreign workers is also well-known to the general 
public. An article by the Nikkei Asian on March 12, 2016 quoted the Prime Minister saying “I 
want the utilization of foreign talent to be robustly advanced”35, yet another article in The 
Japan Times  from April 27th reported on a member of Abe’s policy team saying that there is 
a “domestic allergy” to foreign workers and a lawmaker who said that plans to increase the 
                                                          
34 Reiji Yoshida and Mizuho Aoki, Abe Aims Arrows at New Targets with Three Fresh Goals for ‘Abenomics’, 
20% Rise in GDP, The Japan Times, September 24, 2016, accessed May 27, 2016, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/24/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-outlines-new-goals-abenomics-
20-rise-gdp/#.VycdeOJ96Uk. 
35 Nikkei Asian, “Abe Looking to Boost Foreign Female Workers, Nikkei Asian Review, March 12, 2016, 
http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Abe-looking-to-boost-number-of-foreign-female-
workers 
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inflow of foreigners would “leave Japan in tatters”36. These quotes would certainly raise 
people's eyebrows: exactly what path does Prime Minister Abe want to take when stating 
these seemingly contradictory statements? 
On the one hand PM Abe makes clear that he wants to increasingly make use of foreign labor, 
yet his cabinet does not fail to warn us of the possibly devastating consequences of 
welcoming large numbers of foreign workers in society.  This trend is more or less reflected 
in the Basic Plan for Immigration Control 201537. This report formulates the measures on 
control of the entry of foreign residents and stipulates which paths to be taken, what kind of 
achievements have been made and which challenges are being faced. According to the latest 
version, the core principles of the immigration policy in light of the declining birthrate and 
aging population are, first and foremost, to draw on the potential labor force of women, young 
people and the elderly, and second, to consider the future course for the acceptance of foreign 
nationals. Note the word “consider”, which implies some form of non-commitment. This very 
same word can also be found in the 2010 version38. Clearly, the abovementioned evidence 
highlights a that there is a certain degree of reluctance to accept foreign workers that is both 
found in Shinzo Abe's own words, as well as in formal reports of the Immigration Bureau.  
When going back in history a little further, there is Junichiro Koizumi who served as Prime 
Minister from 2001 until 2006. With the reputation of being "reformer of the unreformable", 
PM Koizumi made striking transformations in the government apparatus and was able to 
alleviate the economy from years of degenerative decline39. Reformist or not, Koizumi has a 
                                                          
36 Linda Sieg, “Japan Eyes More Foreign Workers in Stealthy Challenge to Immigration Taboo”, The Japan 
Times, April 27, 2016, accessed May 15, 2016, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/04/27/national/japan-
eyes-foreign-workers-stealthily-challenging-immigration-taboo/#.VycV_eJ96Uk. 
37 Ministry of Justice, Basic Plan for Immigration Control 2015, 27, http://www.immi-
moj.go.jp/seisaku/2015_kihonkeikaku_honbun_pamphlet_english.pdf.  
38 Ministry of Justice, Basic Plan for Immigration Control 2010, 28, http://www.immi-
moj.go.jp/english/seisaku/keikaku_101006_english.pdf.    
39 The Economist, "The Man Who Remade Japan", The Economist, September 14, 2006, accessed May 30, 2016, 
http://www.economist.com/node/7916942. 
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rather conservative stance towards the acceptance of unskilled foreign workers. This is 
reflected in a 2005 statement of him saying: "If  (the foreign labor) exceeds a certain level, it 
is bound to cause a clash. It is necessary to consider measures to prevent it and then admit 
foreign workers as necessary. Just because there is a labor shortage does not mean we should 
readily allow (foreign workers) to come in"40. Quite similar to Shinzo Abe, this statement 
clearly reflects the PMs reluctant stance in admitting foreign workers into the country.  
However, does this mean that these elite conservative politicians are willing to accept 
foreigners, or does it imply no such thing? Well, if we are also to believe Strausz' arguments 
on the dichotomous typology of conservatives, then both Abe and Koizumi are willing, up to 
a certain extent. The Prime Ministers would then be classified as conservative optimists: Abe 
and Koizumi do not shy away from admitting foreign workers, but they are to be admitted on 
the PMs' terms only. Why this is? Simply put, because the government recognizes the need 
for foreign employees to fill the existing labor shortage. Nonetheless, the government still 
wants to minimize foreign influence, which will be elaborated upon in the next chapter. In 
addition, this classification also implies that both PMS believe that Japanese society is able to 
withstand social and/or political change as a consequence of  immigration of foreign workers. 
Still, another question remains. Has the government - and the elite conservatives politicians in 
it- thought about the effects of this type of policy from the perspective of the workers? 
This question leads us back to the Principal-Agent Theory. The elite conservative politicians - 
being the Principal- act in their own interests. In our current case, this means admitting a 
limited number of foreigners through various back doors on a short-term contract. The 
Principal's dominance over the Agent allows the government to make a take-it-or-leave-it 
offer in the form of the current back door mechanisms. The Agent then either takes this offer 
                                                          
40 Chikako Kashiwazaki and Tsuneo Akaha, " Japanese Immigration Policy: Responding to Conflicting 
Pressures", Migration Policy Institute November 1, 2006, accessed May 31, 2016, 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/japanese-immigration-policy-responding-conflicting-pressures. 
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and is able to perform unskilled work in Japan, or not at all. Given the nature of this        
'immigration policy', one would sincerely doubt whether it can even be called as such. Rather, 
is it not a type of  'risk management'? 
These trends, both in rhetoric of the politicians themselves, as in what is stated in official 
immigration policy reports, clearly reflect the conservative stance towards the acceptance of 
foreign workers. Although it is widely recognized that the labor shortage is becoming 
increasingly critical and that domestic sources alone will not be sufficient enough to fill the 
gap, we still see that conservative thoughts about the extent to which Japan should be 
influenced by foreign nationals still very much play a role in the shaping of immigration 
policies.  
 
Immigration Policy in Japan: The Existence of Back Door Mechanisms 
As mentioned in the introduction, Japan’s immigration policy has been and still is under the 
scrutiny by the media for being strict. There exists no formal policy to take in unskilled 
foreign workers, yet there are government programs that allow them to enter Japan through 
back doors to perform unskilled work for a limited period of time. It has been argued that the 
purpose of these back door mechanisms is that of supplying cheap labor to satisfy the needs of 
capitalists41. Other research mentioned how informally admitting unskilled foreign workers 
for on a temporary basis is a means to fill the labor shortage in certain sectors of small- and 
medium-sized businesses4243. Whilst examining the function of four major back door 
mechanisms within the broader framework of the Principal-Agent Theory, this chapter will 
                                                          
41 Junya Morooka, "The Rhetoric of the Foreign Worker Problem in Contemporary Japan", (PhD diss., 
University of Pittsburgh, 2006), 44. 
42 Atsushi Kondo, “Immigration Law and Foreign Workers in Japan”, Kyushu Sangyo University Faculty of 
Economics discussion paper (2000), 2. 
43 Hiromi Mori, Immigration Policy and Foreign Workers in Japan, (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1997), 102. 
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argue that indeed, this is the case. Subsequently,  it will demonstrate how preferences and 
interests of elite conservative politicians, being the 'Principal', collide with those of unskilled 
foreign workers, being the 'Agent'.  
Sectors that are in labor shortage are able to tap into the pool of labor that is supplied through 
the means of government programs that allow foreigners to come and work in Japan. One 
such program is for nurses and caregivers under the Japanese Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) with Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Whilst working in training 
facilities for a maximum of 3 years, a yearly fixed number of nurses and caregivers are being 
prepared for a qualification exam that will grant them indefinite visa renewal upon passing the 
exam44. At the moment, the participants in this program are granted to stay under the terms of 
the “Technical Intern Training” visa. However, a recent article in The Japan Times announced 
that the Abe cabinet approved the creation of a new visa category specially reserved for 
foreign nurses and caregivers as a part of the efforts to fill the labor shortage in that sector45. 
Still, given the fact that an EPA is not an immigration policy, participants (the Agents ) could 
feel constrained and confused between a labor market that is accepting of them, but not 
entirely; and of the condition of being allowed to work, but, again, not entirely. Fact is, if 
these foreigners want to do paid work in Japan, they have no option but to agree with the 
restrictions that are imposed on them. 
Another such program is the Technical Intern Training Program (TITP) by the Japan 
International Training Cooperation Organization (JITCO)46. This program aims at training 
foreigners in the technical field for a maximum of 3 years in Japan before returning home to 
                                                          
44 Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, “Concerning the Acceptance of Foreign Nurses and Care Worker 
Candidates from Indonesia, The Philippines and Vietnam”, accessed April 1, 2016, 
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/koyou_roudou/koyou/gaikokujin/other22/index.html.  
45 Tomohiro Osaki, “Foreign Nurses, Caregivers to Get Special Visa Status”, The Japan Times, March 6, 2015, 
accessed March 31, 2016, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/03/06/national/foreign-nurses-caregivers-to-
get-special-visa-status/#.Vx3tMOJ96Uk.  
46 JITCO, “Outline of Technical  Intern Training Program”, Japan International Training Cooperation 
Organization, accessed April 7, 2016, https://www.jitco.or.jp/english/overview/itp/index.html.   
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transfer their acquired knowledge. In 2014 the number of trainees entering Japan under the 
visa of “Technical Intern Training” was as high as 92.126 as opposed to 54.107 in 200547. 
Clearly, the number of foreigners fit to perform unskilled (technical) work is on the rise. Their 
visa however, stipulates that their period of stay shall not exceed their given maximum and 
that they may only engage in activities corresponding to their status. In this way, the 
government can just as easily dispose of these laborers, as they can acquire them. Evidently, 
issuing such short-term contracts that impose restrictions concerning the type of work enables 
the government to exert a high degree of control on the lives of  these employees. 
A third way of tapping into the pool of unskilled foreign workers is by means of foreign 
students who are also allowed to work, provided that they fill out the right documents. 
Originally, the residence status of “student” does not allow one to engage in activities other 
than that of receiving education. However, the government has thought of a way to make it 
possible to also employ this group of people for unskilled labor. By completing the form 
called “Application for Permission to Engage in Activity Other than that Permitted under the 
Status of Residence Previously Granted”, students are allowed to work part-time up to 28 
hours a week and 8 hours a day during a long holiday48. As table 1 shows, the number of 
foreign students present in Japan in 1996 more than doubled from 89.307 to 201.511 in 2010. 
This further highlights the conclusion in the existing literature that the government 
acknowledges that an extra supply in labor is needed, albeit through an informal yet arbitrary 
manner. 
 
 
                                                          
47 Ministry of Justice, “Immigration Control”, accessed March 31, 2016, 
http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyuukokukanri01_00013.html. 
48 Immigration Bureau of Japan, "Application for Permission to Engage in Activity Other than that Permitted 
under the Status of Residence Previously Granted", accessed April 7, 2016, http://www.immi-
moj.go.jp/english/tetuduki/kanri/shyorui/09.html.  
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Table 1. Registered Aliens by Residency Status 1996-2010 
Status 1996 2000 2005 2010 
   Permanent   626.040   657.605   801.713     964.195 
   Non-Permanent   789.096   1.028.839   1.209.842  1.169.965 
Spouse or child of Japanese national 258.847 279.625 259.656 196.248 
Long-term resident 172.882 237.607 265.639 194.602 
Student 89.307 114.761 157.715 201.511 
Family stay 60.783 72.878 86.055 118.865 
Entertainer 20.103 53.847 36.376 9.247 
Trainee 20.883 36.199 54.107 9.343 
Specialist in humanities/international business 27.377 34.739 55.276 68.467 
Technician 11.052 16.531 29.044 46.592 
Skilled work 8.767 11.349 15.112 30.192 
Intra-Company Transferee 5.941 8.657 11.977 16.140 
Education 7.514 8.375 9.449 10.012 
Professor 4.573 6.477 8.407 8.050 
Spouse or child of permanent resident 6.460 6.685 11.066 20.251 
Others 94.607 140.842 209.964 237.628 
Total 1.415.136 1.686.444 2.011.555 2.134.151 
Source: Ministry of Justice Japan49 
 
A fourth major way of admitting unskilled foreign workers through a back door mechanism is 
by means of the “nikkeijin provision”, as it is informally dubbed. Nikkeijin are people from 
Japanese descent and who are allowed to enter Japan under the visa of “long term resident”50. 
Under the 1990 Immigration act, nikkeijin and their families are admitted on a visa that is 
valid for 3 years, with no restrictions on renewal. Their scope of activities is unlimited –
meaning that they are allowed to do unskilled work. As a response to the introduction of this 
new visa category, the number of nikkeijin has boomed since the 1990s. Especially the 
number of Brazilian nikkeijin registered in Japan has increased significantly from a mere 
3.608 in 1985 to 71.495 in 1990, and up to a peek level of 302.080 in 2005 as shown in table 
2. After 2005 their number has dropped slightly, most likely because the provision traces back 
only a few generations.  
 
                                                          
49 Ministry of Justice, “Immigration Control”, accessed March 31, 2016, 
http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyuukokukanri01_00013.html. 
50 Japanese Law Translation, “Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act: Article 2-2 and Appended 
Table II”, accessed April 25, 2016. http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=1934&vm=&re=.  
18 
 
Table 2. Registered Aliens by Nationality 1985-2010. 
Nationality 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Asia 789.729 924.560 1.039.149 1.244.629 1.483.985 1.681.469 
      Korea  683.313    687.940    666.376    635.269    598.687    565.989 
      China 74.924    150.339    222.991    335.575    519.562    687.156 
      Philippines 12.261    49.092    74.297    144.871     187.261    210.181 
      Indonesia 1.704    3.623    6.956    19.346     25.079    25.532 
      Other     33.566    68.530    109.568     153.441    192.611 
South America 3.608 71.495 221.865 312.921 376.348 300.142 
      Brazil     1.955     56.429     176.440     254.395     302.080     230.552 
      Other     1.653     15.066     45.425     58.206     74.268     69.590 
Other 57.275 79.262 101.157 128.894 151.222 152.540 
Total 850.612 1.075.317 1.362.171 1.686.444 2.011.555 2.134.151 
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan, Statistics Bureau5152 
 
As this chapter has demonstrated, these programs and regulations, and the trends in number of 
alien registrants in Japan reflect how the government introduced legal, yet informal ways 
under the revised Immigration act of the 1990s to employ foreign laborers to do unskilled 
work. The four major ones have been presented in this chapter and although the programs and 
regulations mentioned above are only a handful, their existence reflects the governments' 
thinking on the question which type of people to admit, how and on what terms. The existence 
of these types of government programs and regulations are also proof that that the government 
recognizes the shortage of unskilled labor in various sectors as the purpose of these programs 
is to fill the gap in the workforce. Yet, instead of opting for a formal policy to admit unskilled 
foreign workers, the government, up until this day, has been sticking to admitting these types 
of workers through back door mechanisms in a least legally binding way. When foreign 
workers (the Agents) take up this offer to enter Japan through a back door mechanism, they 
do so on the terms of the government (the Principal). As such, these terms restrict the workers' 
rights in various ways. One can imagine that causes a collision between the preferences of the 
government and the preferences of the unskilled foreign worker. The consequences thereof, 
                                                          
51 Statistics Bureau Japan, “Persons who entered or departed from Japan by Nationality (2010)”, accessed March 
25, 2016, http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?lid=000001075069. 
52 Statistics Bureau Japan, “Registered Aliens by Nationality and Status of Residence (1948-2009)”, accessed 
March 25, 2016, http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/02.htm.  
19 
 
being the 'moral hazard' that is inherent to PAT, is something we will highlight in our next 
chapter.  
 
Citizenship types in Japan: The Vulnerability of Unskilled Foreign 
Workers 
As existing literature argues, there is a direct link between the type of citizenship a person 
obtains and the position one has in society5354. Not surprisingly, this is also the case with 
foreign workers that enter Japan through one of the various government mechanisms. Upon 
entering the country through a work-related government program like TITP, or on the basis of 
the nikkeijin provision, a person obtains a visa which clearly stipulates their rights and duties. 
These include the scope of activities, the duration of stay, the allowance of visa renewal and 
possibly certain details about an employment contract. These strict rules and regulations lead 
to the respective person taking an unequal and subordinate position, making that person 
vulnerable to exploitation and human rights violations on the work floor55. In this chapter, we 
will discuss these issues within the broader framework of the PAT. The 'moral hazard' that is 
inherent to this theory will be presented as Agents' unequal and subordinate position that leads 
to vulnerable employment. Subsequently, the harsh realities of exploitation that will be 
explicitly mentioned in this chapter will allow us to demonstrate just how important the 
formalizing of a policy for the admittance of unskilled foreign actually is.  
According to the 1990 revised Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act “a foreign 
national can reside in Japan only under a status of residence”, may “engage in activities (…) 
                                                          
53 Hiroshi Komai, Foreign Migrants in Contemporary Japan, (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press 2001), 101. 
54 Robert Stuart Yoder, Deviance and Inequality in Japan: Japanese Youth and Foreign Migrants, (Bristol: 
Policy Press, 2011), 65. 
55 Ibid. 
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corresponding to that status”, and their maximum duration of stay shall be “determined for 
each status of residence … and when the status of residence is other than that of diplomat, 
official or permanent resident,(…) the period  of stay shall not exceed 3 years”56. These 
regulations are stipulated in the general provisions of the Immigration Act and reflect how 
each of the 27 statuses of residence have a specific set of rules which a person has to abide by. 
Out of these 27 visa types, 19 are specifically work-related. However, as we have 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, it is possible under certain circumstances to expand the 
scope of activities by formally applying for this at the immigration bureau. For example 
students can be employed to do unskilled work. Thus, these 19 work-related visas can be 
supplemented with regulations for persons of other non-work-related types of visas to also 
participate in the Japanese labor market.  
As each of these residency statuses list limiting regulations concerning all sorts of rights and 
duties of the respective persons, the minute they set foot in Japan it also places them on an 
unequal level with the rest of society. Some may not be allowed to stay permanently, some 
may not be allowed to renew their visa and some may not be allowed to freely choose what 
type of activity they engage in. According to Hironori Onuki, exactly this categorization of  
“non-permanent” or “temporary” is what increases marginalization and  vulnerability to 
exploitation57. For example, in the case of the “Technical Intern Training” visa, the duration 
of stay is currently limited to 3 years and the employment contract binds them to specific 
types of public or private organizations. This means that these workers are neither allowed to 
individually choose their employers, nor switch from employer, which leaves them no room 
to maneuver when issues might arise. 
                                                          
56 “Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act: Article 2-2”, Japanese Law Translation, accessed April 
25, 2016. http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=1934&vm=&re=. 
57 Hironori Onuki, "The Everyday Spaces of Global Labour Migration: Migrant Workers as Political Agents in 
Japan". (PhD diss., York University Toronto, 2012), 282. 
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Indeed, media reports on exploitation of trainees show us the harsh realities of how these 
regulations play out in practice; an article in The New York Times from July 20th, 2010 
presents us with the case of six young Chinese women who said to be subject to 16-hour 
workdays, with little training of some sorts, and that under the careful watch of the 
governments foreign trainee program58. Similarly, a recent report in Bloomberg from 
February 22, 2016 shows the case of a female worker who, upon entering Japan through a 
government program, came to work under an employer who made her work long hours, paid 
less than minimum-wage for overtime and who still owes her a significant amount of unpaid 
wages59. All the while she wasn't able to change her employer due to the terms on her visa.  
Just like the abovementioned cases, caregivers face the same kind of challenges as they fall 
under the same category as technical intern trainees. Their training program is being criticized 
in the international media for its qualification exams that are too difficult to pass, insufficient 
language instruction, and, in some cases, unsafe working environments60. Not surprisingly, 
the Yomiuri Shimbun negatively reported of passing rates for the exam lingering at a relatively 
low 10% with many nurses already returning home 61. One can imagine the strain this can put 
not only on economic relations between the participating states of the EPA of which the 
caregiver program is part of, but also on the supply of labor to the care facilities and on the 
possibility for the participants to lead a stable life with a steady income. As mentioned in the 
in the previous chapter, the Abe cabinet has approved the creation of a new type of visa solely 
for caregivers and nurses. Besides introducing extension of the internship period from 3 years 
                                                          
58 Hiroko Tabuchi, “Japan Training Program is Said to Exploit Workers”, The New York Times, July 20, 2010, 
accessed May 25, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/business/global/21apprentice.html?_r=0. 
59 Yoshiaki Nohara, “How Japan Exploits Low-Paid Foreign Workers”, Bloomberg February 22, 2016, accessed 
April 1, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-22/japan-expands-foreign-worker-plan-u-s-
cited-for-forced-labor. 
60 Tomohiro Osaki, "Caregiver Trainee Program Coming Up Short, But Options on Table Also Daunting", The 
Japan Times, April 19, 2015, accessed April 1, 2016,  
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/04/19/national/caregiver-trainee-program-facing-
challenges/#.VwYUvOJ96Ul. 
61 Yomiuri Shimbun, “260 Nurses Already Returned Home”, Yomiuri Shimbun, May 1, 2013.  
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to a maximum of 5 years, this visa also aims at increasing state supervision to eradicate 
malpractice by employers, as well as protecting the workers’ human rights. Yet, it is not 
necessarily to be expected that this will significantly change the current circumstances since a 
new visa category and a longer duration of stay still comes up short of an official policy for 
permanent admittance. Hence, with this new visa category we may expect to see the already 
known problems in the existing government programs flow over into this new one. 
Despite what is discussed above, the level of social stratification is not limited to the 
categorization between foreigners and Japanese nationals alone, but also within the group of 
foreigners migrants itself. For example, nikkeijin are granted a special status as ethnic 
Japanese and are given the residence status of “long term resident” which has no limits on 
visa renewal or on their scope of activities62. This places nikkeijin directly ahead of foreigners 
who are not from Japanese descent. Especially when compared to foreigners entering Japan 
on the basis of a “Technical Intern Training” visa , the difference in rights becomes 
painstakingly clear. Still, although nikkeijin are ahead of certain other groups of foreign 
workers, they are at a lower stratification level when compared to native Japanese who are 
employed as unskilled workers. Nonetheless, the case of nikkeijin and their special status 
because of their Japanese descent proves us how some foreign workers are to a higher or 
lesser degree vulnerable to exploitation or violations of human rights. 
As has been demonstrated throughout this chapter, the different rights of a person according 
to his or her visa category are directly linked to the relative position one has in society. 
Limitations on rights concerning visa-renewals, duration of stay, type of work and type of 
employer are the most important factors in these dynamics. Because the government does not 
admit these foreign workers on the basis of an official policy they are forced to accept a 
                                                          
62 Hiromasa Mori, “Foreign Migrant Workers in Japan: Trends and Policies”, Asia and Pacific Migration 
Journal 4:2-3 (1995), 415, 418. 
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relatively lower position in society. It is not just a dichotomous categorization between 
foreign unskilled workers and native unskilled workers, there is also a difference within the 
group of foreigners themselves. The nikkeijin, who enjoy more lenient visa regulations, are 
proof of this. Still, as long as a formal policy to accept these persons remains absent, the 
government remains implicitly at fault creating these levels of social stratification and 
subsequently, vulnerable employment.  
 
Conclusion 
This thesis has sought to shift away from the focus on searching for the meaning of the 
existence of back door policies in the post-1990s Immigration Act context, and more towards 
the question of why there still is no formal policy in effect to admit unskilled foreign workers 
as such. Whilst examining our central question in the broader framework of PAT, we have 
been able to provide insight into the role of elite conservative politicians within the 
government as Principal in immigration policymaking, and what the consequences in terms of 
a moral hazard are for unskilled foreign workers as Agents. The dominant position of the 
Japanese government over unskilled foreign worker is exactly what enables them to make a 
take-it-or-leave-it offer: foreigners either get to work through the existing back door 
mechanism, or not. This in turn, creates the moral hazard that is vulnerable employment: upon 
entry, unskilled foreign workers take an unequal and subordinate place in society that makes 
them vulnerable to exploitation and violations of human rights.  
Although this thesis has approached the subject of immigration from the side of elite 
conservative politicians within the government and their role in immigration policymaking, it 
did not examine the dynamics of the bureaucratic decision-making process. By further taking 
this realm into consideration it could possibly strengthen the view of this thesis. Furthermore, 
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it did not look into external pressures from for example NGOs or action groups that might 
have pressured the government to take a certain more positive stance in welcoming unskilled 
foreign workers. Given that the issues raised in our research are well known both nationally 
and internationally, the role of NGOs and action groups could have significant impact in the 
path the Japanese government decides to take when it comes to immigration policies. For a 
more complete picture, future research could take this into consideration as well.  
To conclude, and to answer our central question: why is it that the Japanese government does 
not accept unskilled foreign workers through a formal policy, but does allow the continued 
participation of unskilled foreign workers in the labor market through back door mechanisms?,  
we would like to highlight the following. Elite conservative politicians are able to exert 
considerable influence in the government and immigration policymaking that poses an 
obstacle in formalizing a policy to admit unskilled foreign workers. These elite conservatives 
fear that large-scale immigration could have too great an impact on society and therefore want 
to limit this as much as possible. Nonetheless, because of a longstanding labor shortage 
foreign labor is required to meet the demand. These factors have led to the government taking 
in unskilled foreign workers on the basis of informal back door mechanisms. These 
mechanism restrict the respective workers' rights in various ways, forcing them to take an 
unequal and subordinate place in society, which in turn heightens their vulnerability to 
exploitation and human rights violations. 
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